Formal Proofs for the NYCT Line 7 (Flushing) Modernization Project

Abstract

The New York City Transit Authority has included formal proofs at system level as part of the safety assessment for its New York subway Line 7 modernization project, based on the CBTC from Thales Toronto. ClearSy carries out these proofs. In this paper, we describe the expected results and benefits of such proofs. We also discuss the methodology, in particular the importance of obtaining a natural language precursor for proofs. This step is paramount to find the simplest reasons why the design ensures the wanted properties.

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Reference

% BibTex
@inproceedings{SabatierBRG12,
  author       = {Denis Sabatier and
                  Lilian Burdy and
                  Antoine Requet and
                  J{\'{e}}r{\^{o}}me Gu{\'{e}}ry},
  editor       = {John Derrick and
                  John S. Fitzgerald and
                  Stefania Gnesi and
                  Sarfraz Khurshid and
                  Michael Leuschel and
                  Steve Reeves and
                  Elvinia Riccobene},
  title        = {Formal Proofs for the {NYCT} Line 7 (Flushing) Modernization Project},
  booktitle    = {Abstract State Machines, Alloy, B, VDM, and {Z} - Third International
                  Conference, {ABZ} 2012, Pisa, Italy, June 18-21, 2012. Proceedings},
  series       = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science},
  volume       = {7316},
  pages        = {369--372},
  publisher    = {Springer},
  year         = {2012},
  url          = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30885-7\_34},
  doi          = {10.1007/978-3-642-30885-7\_34},
  timestamp    = {Sun, 02 Jun 2019 21:23:59 +0200},
  biburl       = {https://dblp.org/rec/conf/asm/SabatierBRG12.bib},
  bibsource    = {dblp computer science bibliography, https://dblp.org}
}